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Profits are the ultimate sign of market power. But for the past 40 years, economists and
antitrust practitioners have disparaged the measurement of profit margins as unreliable. That
needs to change, and new scholarship showing rising margins across the economy is leading
the way.

All debates regarding antitrust and competition policy are about profits, whether they are too
high or too low, but nobody will admit it. Some claim that antitrust is about output. Others
that it is about the political power of large firms. Still others that it is about innovation. But
nobody ever claims that it is about stopping firms from earning too damn much.
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And yet antitrust can only be about profits. For without profits in excess of those earned
under competition, there can be no harm to competition and therefore
  no inefficient
reduction in output, undemocratic increase in political power, or incentive for or against
innovation. Profits are the ultimate measure of market power.
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It follows that the central quantity of antitrust, the thing that must be measured and acted
upon, is the profit level—what economists call margins. If margins cannot be measured, or at
least guessed, then there can be no antitrust in practice, for there can be no other way of
observing market power.

The argument of the Chicago School, starting in the 1960s, that margins cannot reliably be
measured, therefore created an existential crisis for antitrust, one that led to great reductions
in antitrust enforcement, and a consensus that antitrust should act timidly, if at all.

But skepticism about margins did not lead to a repeal of the antitrust laws. And so a peculiar
détente between the Chicago School and the world of antitrust practice has prevailed for the
past forty years, in which practitioners—including agency staff and the academics who serve
as experts in antitrust cases—on the one hand pay lip service to the immeasurability of
margins but on the other hand measure them all the time in their antitrust work.

Profits became the elephant in the room.

The Margins Challenge

This détente has come under stress in recent years, but not from a direction you might expect.
The stress has come not from advocates of antitrust reform associated with the Open Markets
Institute, but instead from a new group of economists who have dared to take margins
seriously again.
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They have shown abnormal expansion in margins over the past two decades or so, a period
that corresponds uncannily to that over which antitrust enforcement
has been in decline.
 
None of the variables you might think would account for increased profitability, such as
increased investment in new technologies, explain this trend.
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The explanation that leaps out, one that these scholars have not been able to explain away
with their data, is that firms have been leveraging the greater market power permitted to
them by Chicago-School-inspired declines in antitrust enforcement to extract more profits
from markets. This conclusion has been supported by data showing an increase in overall
market concentration over the past twenty years, an increase in concentration in labor
markets, and a corresponding stagnancy in wages. The absence of expanded margins in
Europe, which unlike the United States has not seen a decline in antitrust enforcement, also
supports this inference.

Much of this evidence was brilliantly summarized by leading antitrust economist Fiona Scott
Morton in her keynote address at the 2018 Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation
Annual Conference, and again by former FTC chief economist Jonathan Baker in remarks at
the FTC hearings this fall, signaling that this work may be making its way into the antitrust
mainstream.

The Incoherence of the Margins Détente

The incoherence of the détente that these scholars are undermining was on display at
Harvard Law School this past November, where, as part of a conference sponsored by
Competition Policy International and the Computer & Communications Industry Association,
some academics pushed back against the challenge posed by the new margins work.

At the first panel of the day, distinguished NYU economist Lawrence White decried the failure
of the margins economists to learn the lesson that an earlier generation of antitrust
economists learned in the 1970s from their encounter with Chicago School skeptics.
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Those skeptics had argued that costs are almost impossible to define, let alone measure, and
without a reliable measure of costs, a reliable measure of margins—defined
as the difference
 
between prices and costs—is also impossible. Costs, emphasized the skeptics, include not just
the prices of commodities, like fuel and computers, but also the costs of keeping top
ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION 
DIGITAL PLATFORMS
ECONOMIC HISTORY 
RESEARCH
TEACHING 
COMMENTARY
management talent, promoting creative thinking within the firm, attracting investment in
risky ventures, insuring against future shocks, and acquiring many other inputs that are
difficult to price. What looks like profit today, they argued, is the cushion that means the
difference between success and bankruptcy tomorrow.

White here invoked noted mid-20th-century industrial organization economist Leonard Weiss,
who was once a staunch believer in margins analysis, but who, according to White, eventually
accepted Chicago’s skepticism and moved on. Today’s margins work, argued White, is
ignoring the lesson that Weiss learned. In White’s view, all the supposed evidence of rising
margins is just so much statistical froth.

But to what exactly did Weiss move on forty years ago? According to White, it was the view
that prices, rather than margins, should be used to measure market power. According to this
price-effects approach, if statistical analysis shows that a suspect firm—or merger—has
experienced price increases that cannot be explained by extraneous factors, such as an
increase in input costs, or a change in demand, then it is safe to assume that the price
increases reflect market power. The apparent beauty of this method is that there is no need to
measure margins.

But the ability of this approach to avoid the measurement of margins is superficial.
Controlling price effects for input costs, which is an essential part of the price effects
approach, is actually just a crude way of measuring margins. Antitrust economists may claim
that price effects get them around the measurement problem, but in fact price effects do not.
Prices can only ever be one half of the margins formula, a formula that requires consideration
of costs as well.

To their credit, antitrust practitioners have not in fact gone on simply to measure price effects
without paying any attention to costs, but instead have soldiered on measuring margins. As
one popular introductory antitrust textbook puts it in describing a contemporary workhorse
approach to measuring market power: “The only firm-level data needed for this method are
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those on . . . price, quantity, and firm-specific cost.” So much for getting around the
measurement of margins, with its attendant problem of measuring
 costs.
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Catching Elephants with Cellophane

White inadvertently highlighted the inescapability of the need to measure margins in order to
do antitrust when he went on to discuss antitrust’s famous “cellophane fallacy,” which
happens to teach precisely that prices alone tell us nothing about margins.

The cellophane fallacy takes its name from a 1956 case in which the Supreme Court
incorrectly relied on evidence that DuPont could not profitably raise prices to conclude that
DuPont had no power in the packaging market. The court’s mistake was ignoring the
possibility that DuPont had already exercised its power to raise cellophane prices above
costs, and simply could not milk any more profit from the market through further price
increases. The direct implication of the cellophane fallacy is that only the measurement of
margins—whether prices are in fact above costs—can answer the market power question.

At the conference, White seemed to rely on the cellphone fallacy to make a different
argument: that because price effects are unreliable signals of market power, antitrust
practitioners should be even more timid in their conclusions than they are today. But the case
stands equally for the proposition that because measuring margins is essential to identifying
market power, antitrust should end the détente and put its faith back into margins analysis
once again.

I put the contradiction of an antitrust establishment that both disparages and practices
margins analysis to the panel that day, and the responses were highly instructive. Bruce
Kobayashi, current head of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, stated that “everything” the
Bureau does involves the measurement of margins. Antitrust cannot function without it.

And White, to his credit, threw up his hands, seemingly agreeing that there is a contradiction:
either we doubt the measurability of margins, or we have an antitrust enterprise. But we
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cannot have both.
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but even if it does not, we need to come to terms with the fact that the actions of antitrust
practitioners have already spoken louder than their words. In continuing to muddle along
measuring margins while professing not to be able to measure them, the antitrust
establishment has been telling us for decades that yes, you can measure margins, and run an
entire policy sector based on them.

Recognizing that fact may be all we need to cure antitrust of its present timidity.

Ramsi Woodcock is an Assistant Professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law, and
holds a secondary appointment in the Department of Management at the University of
Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics. An earlier version of this post first
appeared on Professor Woodcock’s antitrust blog.

For more on how to reform antitrust enforcement, check out this three-part series on US
antitrust law by the Capitalisn’t podcast:

Disclaimer: The ProMarket blog is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests. The posts represent
the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty. For more
information, please visit ProMarket Blog Policy.
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